Speakers:
Prof. Dr. Nicholas Startin, University of Bath Andreas Speit, taz, Journalist
Moderator
: Prof. Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, American University
Panel IV (© bpb)
Panel IV (© bpb)
This panel took up one of the predominant themes that had been raised earlier in the day: namely, the issue of Euroscepticism and anti-EU sentiment as it relates to political parties and far right-wing engagement.
Professor Startin spoke first and began by reminding the audience that it is important to remember that there are different degrees of Euroscepticism and different rationales for being anti-EU: it would "be a mistake," he notes, to say that all radical right parties share the same degree of Euroscepticism. Some parties take a hard line against the EU, while for others, it is a softer opposition.
In particular, Professor Startin notes a difference between ideological and strategic Euroskepticism. While some far right parties have deep opposition to the EU as part of their own pro-sovereignty ideology, for other parties, opposing the EU is a strategic or tactical move which enables parties, for example, to express nationalistic sentiments while avoiding being labeled racist or anti-migrant.
Finally, Professor Startin discussed the notion that there are different drivers for change among the radical right over the past 20 years. Maastricht (1992) represented the first major driver of change and was the shift from the EU as an economic issue to a political unity. The second major period was EU enlargement in 2004-2007, when a dozen additional countries were added, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the third and most recent driver of change is the Eurozone crisis.
Andreas Speit – who joined the panel literally 12 hours before the conference began, due to the unexpected illness of planned speaker Florian Hartleb – began by introducing himself and his background as a German journalist, since there was no written biographical information about him in the program materials.
Mr. Speit then talked in depth about several different aspects of Euroscepticism, focused in particular on whether the expected gain of far right wing seats in the EU parliamentary elections in May would also mean additional cooperation between the different parties. Mr. Speit sees the possibility of such further cooperation, noting that there is a "hohe Bereitschaft" and referencing earlier forms of cooperation and "Vernetzung" that have a deep history, such as in the right-wing rock scene. But he also described tensions and differences across the various national far right parties which may make it less likely that they will cooperate. Marine Le Pen, for example, has made it clear that they would not join with the German NPD, who Le Pen sees as "really extreme". Mr. Speit traced two further themes in his remarks. First, he discussed the ways in which far right parties portray the European Union as an "agent of globalization". In this way, the EU takes the blame for any kind of perceived negative impact of economic globalization.
Second, and relatedly, Mr. Speit traced some of the cultural roots of Euroscepticism and resistance to the EU. The NPD, he notes, calls Europe a "Völkergefängnis", and argues that the EU will destroy national cultures. He described parties which refer to a "white Europe" and to villagers who lament that the EU is taking away their "French cheese" (Französischer Käse) by imposing restrictions or regulations on production that are seen as ruining long histories of local traditions.
Moderator Professor Cynthia Miller-Idriss then invited the audience to raise questions and make comments by lining up at the microphone, and while they got ready to do this, posed the first question for discussion, following up on some of Professor Cas Mudde’s comments about the far right movements being based more strongly on social/cultural/identity concerns than on economic ones. She asked the two speakers to explain how we might understand Euroscepticism in light of this claim, particularly in terms of Professor Startin's assertion that Euroscepticism is a strategic way of avoiding being labeled racist and Mr. Speit's discussion of cultural resistance to European regulation. To what extent is Eurosceptism based on identity concerns, asks Professor Miller-Idriss?
Both respondents offered lively and engaging replies and then a rich discussion with the audience ensued. Among other questions, audience members asked whether it is possible to be anti-EU and not be far right.
The panel was fairly well-attended, with approximately 20-30 audience members. Several themes raised by the speakers echoed themes that had come up earlier in the day. For example, Professor Startin's opening argument that there are many different degrees of Euroscepticism among far right parties echoes Professor Cas Mudde's earlier explanation, in his conference opening remarks, of different degrees of Euroscepticism among the general population. The vast majority of Europeans, according to opinion polls Mudde cites, want some kind of changes vis-a-vis the EU, but these range from a desire for repatriation of powers to fundamental renegotiation to complete withdrawal. Professor Startin's reminder that there are degrees of anti-EU sentiment within far right political parties - ranging from soft opposition to very hard-line anti-EU positions - is much in line with these reports on general population opinions. A second example is in this panel’s discussion of the distinction between economic motivations and cultural motivations for Euroscepticism and anti-EU sentiment. This panel’s speakers echoed arguments made earlier in the day that economic difficulty alone does not explain Euroscepticism; rather, at least some anti-EU sentiment is grounded in social and cultural dimensions related to identity and belonging.
