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Recent developments on asylum and migration in Sweden | Northern Europe | bpb.de

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Recent developments on asylum and migration in Sweden

Bernd Parusel

/ 4 Minuten zu lesen

Once seen as a "humanitarian superpower", Sweden has shifted its migration policy since 2015, adopting measures of deterrence that have altered the country’s reputation as a welcoming society.

Passengers in Stockholm (21.11.2022). (© picture-alliance, Tim Aro/TT)

The high number of asylum seekers in 2015 triggered a sharp migration policy turnaround in Sweden – and continues to affect debates until today. Although the number of asylum seekers has sharply declined (see Figure 1), the government remains committed to stepping up policies of deterrence and control. Restrictive approaches have not only been taken on asylum applicants, refugees and people migrating for family reasons, but also on the acquisition of Swedish citizenship and the immigration of non-EU workers. This migration policy course has also been influenced by electoral successes of the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, debates about failed integration and alleged abuse of the welfare state, as well as a rise in organized crime by gangs with connections to countries in the Western Balkans and the Middle East.

Asylum and family reunification

In the autumn of 2015, the then government coalition of Social Democrats and Greens introduced temporary measures to make Sweden a less attractive destination for people seeking protection. In addition to enhancing border controls, including reintroduced checks at Sweden’s intra-Schengen borders and extraterritorial identity checks on people boarding buses, trains and ferries, the government implemented several restrictive measures: Refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection were granted temporary residence permits instead of permanent ones, family reunification was limited, and the granting of residence on (non-asylum) humanitarian grounds was severely restricted. Some of these measures were later relaxed again but subsequently re-introduced, with the exception of identity checks.

The current centre-right government, which is supported by the Sweden Democrats, has broadened and intensified this approach of deterrence, announcing a “paradigm shift” on migration. The cooperation agreement between the governing parties and the right-wing Sweden Democrats outlines a programme of systematically lowering reception and asylum standards. The aim is that Sweden would, upon completion of the programme, in no way position itself as being more generous than what EU law requires as absolute minimum standards. The government also reduced the annual refugee resettlement quota from 5,000 to 900 admissions.

Labour immigration

The system for the admission of workers from non-EU countries – once considered one of the most liberal in the world – has also been tightened. For example, foreign workers are no longer allowed to bring family members if they cannot financially support them, and the monthly salary threshold for admission was more than doubled – from SEK 13,000 (about 1,140 Euros) to 80 percent of the median wage, currently SEK 28,480 (about 2,500 Euros). This policy excludes many potential labour migrants with lower qualification levels from immigration. The admission of highly skilled workers is still being promoted.

Overall immigration and public debate

Over the past five years, immigration levels have been lower than during the five-year-period before, while emigration has tended to increase (see Figure 2).

When Sweden reached a population of nine million in 2004, this was widely celebrated. Today, the population is just above 10.5 million, but this is often discussed in negative terms as the growth is to a large degree a result of immigration, which is often portrayed as a problem rather than an achievement. The share of foreign-born people in the Swedish population currently stands at 20.6 percent. In public debates, immigration is often associated with crime, especially gang violence, although this is not a result of recent immigration but rooted in long-grown problems such as segregation, inequality and poverty.

Ukrainian refugees

Only a minor share of people displaced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which started in late February 2022, have come to Sweden. Like other EU member states, Sweden provides temporary protection in accordance with the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive. However, it has adopted a relatively strict interpretation of the rights granted under this status. As of June 2024, just over 41,000 people from Ukraine held temporary protection status in Sweden.

Sweden’s position in the Common European Asylum System

Unlike ten years ago, Sweden today receives – in relation to its population size – fewer asylum seekers than the EU average. Sweden supported the recent reform of the Common European Asylum System, and during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in spring 2023, it actively contributed to its adoption. Sweden once supported a system of mandatory responsibility-sharing, including relocations of asylum seekers within the EU. However, the current centre-right government opposes such relocations and has indicated that it will not take over applicants from other EU countries.

Policy changes on citizenship and integration

The government wants to make it harder for immigrants to become Swedish citizens by introducing new language and integration requirements and prolonging the required period of residence before naturalization. It is also planning to abandon a long-standing principle of the Swedish welfare state, where all legal residents have traditionally enjoyed equal welfare rights. Under a proposed “qualification” system, immigrants would be required to contribute and meet certain integration requirements before gaining access to welfare benefits. In addition, some entitlements would become dependent on Swedish citizenship, creating a system that distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens when it comes to accessing certain welfare services.

Fussnoten

Fußnoten

  1. Government Offices of Sweden, Adjustment of Swedish asylum regulations and procedures to minimum level required under EU law, Press release, 9 October 2023.

  2. Government Offices of Sweden, Increased maintenance requirement for work permits, Press release, 10 May 2023.

  3. Statistics Sweden, Sweden's population in summary 1960-2023, last updated 22 March 2024.

  4. Viktor Sunnemark, “How gang violence took hold of Sweden – in five charts”, The Guardian, 30 November 2023; Brottsförebyggande rådet [Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention], Misstänkta för brott bland personer med inrikes respektive utrikes bakgrund, Rapport 2021:9, p. 109–119.

  5. Nordic Council of Ministers/UNHCR, Implementation of temporary protection for refugees from Ukraine – A systematic review of the Nordic countries, 2022.

  6. Eurostat, 4.3 million people under temporary protection in June, News Article, 9 August 2024.

  7. Bernd Parusel, "Ordförandeskapet och migrationspolitiken", in: Rikard Bengtsson (ed.), För Europa i en ny tid – Sveriges ordförandeskap i EU 2023, Santérus Förlag, 132–156.

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Dr Bernd Parusel is a senior researcher in political science at the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps). His main research interests are in policies on migration, integration, asylum and borders in the EU and in the Member States of the EU.