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Migration from Russia to Georgia and Armenia

Tsypylma Darieva

/ 8 Minuten zu lesen

Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens have emigrated, many of them to Georgia and Armenia. Who are these ‘new’ migrants?

Protest in Georgia's capital Tbilisi in May 2023 after the first direct flight of a Russian passenger plane from Moscow landed in Tbilisi after a four-year break. (© picture-alliance, Anadolu Agency | Mirian Meladze)

As a borderland and contact zone between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus region (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) has always been a place of cross-border mobility and exchange. Migration from Russia to the South Caucasus goes back to the colonial past of the Russian Tsarist Empire, and this history continues to inform the political and economic dimensions of migration from Russia to Georgia and Armenia.

As an area where the cultural and political spaces of the Russian, Ottoman and Persian worlds have historically overlapped, the Caucasus has been the subject of regional power politics since the nineteenth century. In wars with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, Russia succeeded in bringing the Caucasus region completely under its control in the mid-nineteenth century. This explains why, from the perspective of the Kremlin and Russian society, this region is viewed as a ‘southern periphery’ on the edge of Europe and Asia.

Historically, there have been several major migratory movements of different groups from different parts of Russia, with both voluntary and forced migration shaping the Caucasus region. In the context of early Russian resettlement and colonisation policies, Russian Orthodox religious minorities, Russian peasants and administrative elites arrived alongside the military. Later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russians settled either as workers, skilled labourers and merchants in the larger cities of the Caucasus (Tbilisi, Baku, Batumi, Yerevan, Gyumri) or as a religious minority (Molokans, a breakaway sect from the Russian Orthodox Old Believers) in rural areas. During the Soviet era, hundreds of Russian-speaking skilled workers came to the South Caucasus, where they were mainly employed in industry. Nevertheless, this population of Russian origin formed a relatively small minority in Georgia and Armenia, much smaller than in Central Asia or the Baltic states, for example.

The political upheavals of the 1990s led to a severe recession throughout the Soviet Union, which also brought major social upheavals to the post-Soviet Caucasus – including growing nationalist sentiment and related inter-ethnic conflicts. In the 1990s, the region witnessed an exodus of ethnic Russians and other Slavic groups, mostly back to Russia.

Who are the Russians currently coming to Georgia and Armenia?

The beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022 led to a new wave of emigration from Russia to the South Caucasus. After the start of the war and the subsequent partial military mobilisation in Russia in September 2022, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens left their homeland in search of political and economic freedom – for fear of borders being closed, conscription and, in some cases, political persecution and arrest in Russia. Georgia and Armenia were the main destination countries for these migrants; for both countries, Russian nationals do not require an entry visa. Georgia's capital Tbilisi, the third-largest Georgian city Batumi on the Black Sea, and Armenia's capital Yerevan became the most important destinations for this new migration from Russia.

Two quantitative surveys (OutRush, Krawatzek et al. 2023) showed that most Russian migrants are economically independent, young and educated with an urban consumer behaviour. On arrival, migrants in Georgia and Armenia tended to identify themselves as ‘relocanty’, ‘expats’ or ‘Russians in exile’. Unlike the local population and the Russian population as a whole, they are economically better off. According to the OutRush study, around 94 per cent were employed before 24 February 2022, and 46 per cent can afford relatively expensive devices, compared to 26 per cent of the Russian population as a whole. They are able to mobilise the resources and capital required to organise their lives in a new place and influence the dynamics of the local market in the process. Nevertheless, the new migrants are legally and politically vulnerable in some situations, especially in Georgia due to the prevalence of anti-Russian attitudes.

The moderate cost of living in Georgia and Armenia and the low regulatory requirements in the business and social spheres make it easier for Russians to arrive and adapt to life there than in Europe. Many newcomers can either work remotely (IT sector) or have sufficient savings to support themselves without an income for a while. However, as surveys show, it is not clear whether Russian migrants will stay in Georgia and Armenia in the long term. Most of them see these safe havens as transit countries from which they intend to move to Europe, the USA or Latin America. An outflow of Russian migrants from Georgia and Armenia could already be observed at the end of 2023.

Many of the new migrants are not only young and well educated, but also politically interested and socially engaged. According to surveys, 55 per cent of respondents had first-hand experience of political repression before leaving Russia. Most respondents mentioned psychological pressure in this context, ten per cent had been arrested during protests and rallies, and three per cent had been the victim of a house search by the police. The remaining 45 per cent of respondents stated that they had not been exposed to political repression in Russia. The majority of new migrants were active in civil society and politics after emigrating (80 per cent).

Most politically active Russian migrants prefer to remain invisible in the host societies and have not taken part in public protests in Georgia and Armenia. They are reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of either country. Their willingness to learn local languages is thus very low. At the same time, visible Russian ‘enclaves’ and communities are emerging in Tbilisi and Yerevan, where migrants have their own co-working spaces, cafés, restaurants, shops, schools and meeting places. In Georgia, for example, Russian migrants have been slow to make contact with the local population, and there are no established contacts at the level of civil society.

Given that Georgia and Armenia were until recently predominantly countries of outmigration (labour and education), the influx of Russians represents a major challenge for both countries. While Georgia's government is tolerant of the new Russian migrants and refuses to impose economic sanctions on Russia, the majority of Georgians is more sceptical about the newcomers. The situation in Armenia is somewhat different. Russian citizens generally regard Armenia as a friendly and safe country. However, relations with Russia have recently deteriorated due to the lack of military support from Russia in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has since openly distanced itself from Russia, for example with regard to its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the presence of Russian troops in Armenia. Not all Russian migrants feel safe in Armenia. This is particularly true for political activists, who fear persecution given Armenia's hitherto close ties with the Russian security services.

How have the host societies reacted?

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted different reactions in host countries like Georgia and Armenia. In general, the attitude of the local population towards the new arrivals is predominantly negative in Georgia, and more positive in Armenia.

In both countries, Russian migrants quickly became important economic players and consumers, with a knock-on effect for the local economy, in particular rental prices. In 2022, for example, the influx of Russian migrants increased the pressure on the housing market in Tbilisi and led to extreme rent hikes. This accelerated gentrification processes and aroused diffuse feelings of insecurity and mistrust among the local population with regard to the new migrants and the Georgian government.

Anti-Russian graffiti in Georgia's capital Tbilisi: “Ruzzia is a terrorist state” (date taken: September 10, 2023). (© Tsypylma Darieva)

According to a representative survey conducted in 2022 by the International Republican Institute, 90 per cent of Georgian respondents see Russia as a threat. The memory of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, when Georgia lost control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is still fresh in many people’s minds and makes communication and rapprochement between Russian migrants and Georgian society more difficult. In Georgia, migration from Russia has triggered fears: many Georgians are worried that the Kremlin could launch a military attack on Georgia – as it did in Ukraine – under the pretext of ‘protecting’ Russian citizens abroad.

A critical attitude towards the presence of Russians in Tbilisi is reflected in numerous examples of urban graffiti in English and Russian with messages like ‘Russia kills’ and ‘You are not welcome’. As migrants from Russia belong to the economically more privileged section of the population, they also contribute to growing social unease and inequality in Georgia (but also in Armenia). Many Georgians see the new migrants with Russian passports as a symbol of Russia as an occupying and colonial power and overlook their individual motives for emigrating.

Translation into English: Dr. Anne Boden

Quellen / Literatur

Amiryan, Tigran (2024): “Relocating” the Russian Cultural Scene: The Case of Russian Migrants in the South Caucasus (Armenia and Georgia). ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy, Stuttgart.

Baranova, Vlada (2023): ‘Leave Not Stay. Introduction to the Thematic Block’. Laboratorium: Russian Review of Social Research 15, no. 3: 4–15.

Chumburidze, Tornike and Sofia Gavrilova (2023): Russian Immigration Sparkes Tensions Ahead of Election, in: Carnegi, Politika, Externer Link: https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91295.

Darchiashvili, Mariam; Gurchiani, Ketevan, Mishakov, Nikita, Schenk Caress (2024): Local Responses to Russian Migration in Georgia and Kazakhstan, Policiy Memos. Ponars, 29.05.2024. Externer Link: www.ponarseurasia.org/local-responses-to-russian-migration-in-georgia-and-kazakhstan/.

Darieva, Tsypylma, Tatiana Golova and Daria Skibo (2023): Russian Migrants in Georgia and Germany: Activism in the Context of Russia’s War Against Ukraine, ZOiS Report 3.

Darieva, Tsypylma and Florian Mühlfried (2015): ‘Kontaktraum Kaukasus. Sprachen, Religionen, Völker und Kulturen’, in: Osteuropa Zeitschrift, Jg. 65, Nr. 7-10, pp. 45–70.

Golova, Tatiana und Tsypylma Darieva (2023): ‘Politisches und Soziales Engagement von Migrantinnen aus Russland im Kontext von Russlands Krieg gegen Ukraine’, in: Russland-Analysen, 436, pp. 2–7.

Gunko, Maria (2022): ‘“Russian imperial gaze”: Reflections from Armenia since the Start of the Russia-Ukraine Military Conflict’, in: Political Geography, Jg. 99, Externer Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102739.

Kakachia, Kornely and Salome Kandelaki (2022): ‘The Russian Migration to Georgia: Threats or Opportunities?’, in: PONARS Eurasis Policy Memo Nr. 818, Externer Link: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Pepm818_Kakachia-Kandelaki_Dec2022.pdf (last accessed: 28.02.2024).

Kamalov, Emil et al. (2023): New Russian Migrants Are Against the War. Political Actions in Russia and Abroad. Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Series ‘The Russian Crisis’, Paper #5), Externer Link: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/international/20458.pdf (last accessed: 28.02.2024).

Kamalov, Emil et al. (2023): Six Months in Exile: A New Life of Russian Emigrants. OutRush: Externer Link: https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/epn2c.

Krawatzek, Félix, George Soroka and Isabelle DeSisto (2023): Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine, ZOiS Report 2/2023, Externer Link: https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/russians-in-the-south-caucasus-political-attitudes-and-the-war-in-ukraine.

Kuleshova, Anna, Chigaleichik, Verena Podolsky, and Vlada Baranova (2023): ‘Russian Migration to Armenia and Georgia in 2022: Enclave Economy and Local Employment’, in: Journal of Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition, 29 May 2023. Externer Link: https://caucasusedition.net/russian-migration-to-armenia-and-georgia-in-2022-enclave-economy-and-local-employment/.

Mühlfried, Florian (2023): ‘Between Hospitality and Hostility: Russian Citizens in Georgia’, Anthropology Today 39, no. 3: 17–20.

Silagadze, Givi (2023): Life of Russian Emigres in Georgia, CRRC Report.

Further reading:



Gevorkyan, Alexander (2013): ‘Caucasus. Migration 19th Century to Present’, in: The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, Oxford, pp. 891–897. Externer Link: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444351071.wbeghm106.

Hohmann et al. (2014): Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Migration, Democratization and Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, London, Tauris.

Sahadeo, Jeff (2024): Russian ‘Relocanty’ in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Cooperation and Tensions between States and Societies, Policy Brief, Prague process.

Fussnoten

Fußnoten

  1. This article only deals with Armenia and Georgia. It does not address Russian migration to Azerbaijan, which is also part of the South Caucasus region. Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan was not a popular destination for Russian migrants before the war against Ukraine. However, a small number of Russians have moved to Azerbaijan since the start of the war. Some of them have ethnic Azerbaijani roots or family members in Azerbaijan. Many of these Russian migrants work in the IT sector and in creative industries. However, there has been very little research on Russian migrants in Azerbaijan to date.

  2. Following its conquest of the Caucasus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian Tsarist Empire forced members of several ethnic groups in the Caucasus – particularly in the North Caucasus and the Black Sea region – to leave their homes. After the subjugation of the Northwest Caucasian peoples in 1864, the Tsarist Empire expelled between half a million and a million Circassians and other Western Caucasians from the North Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the deaths of around 100,000 people (see Darieva and Mühlfried 2015).

  3. OutRush (2022) and Krawatzek et al. (2023).

  4. The term ‘relocanty’ comes from the Russian word ‘relokatsiya’, which denotes a temporary change of (residential) location and is usually used to describe a strategic relocation in the military or business sector. Like the terms ‘expats’ and ‘Russians in exile’, the term relocanty allows the newcomers to distinguish themselves from both the negatively connoted term ‘migrants’ and the local population. In this way, it reflects a sense of superiority rooted in Russia's colonial heritage and regional dominance; even if this connotation is not always clear to the Russian migrants who describe themselves as ‘relocanty’. See also Sahadeo 2023.

  5. Kuleshova et al (2023).

  6. Prominent journalists and politically active Russian citizens were repeatedly denied entry into Georgia at the border crossing (at the airport) (see Darieva, Golova and Skibo 2023).

  7. OutRush (2022), Silagadze (2023).

  8. For more information on the political and social engagement of Russian migrants in Georgia and Germany, see Darieva, Tsypylma, Tatjana Golova and Daria Skibo (2023): Russian Migrants in Georgia and Germany: Activism in the Context of Russia's War against Ukraine. ZOiS Report 3/2023. Externer Link: https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/russian-migrants-in-georgia-and-germany-activism-in-the-context-of-russias-war-against-ukraine (accessed: 03.04.2024).

  9. OutRush (2022), Kamalov et al. (2023).

  10. Chumburidze & Gavrilova (2023).

  11. Darieva, Golova and Skibo (2023).

  12. Externer Link: https://www.politico.eu/article/putins-military-alliance-loses-a-member/

  13. Amiryan (2024), Baranova (2023), Mühlfried (2023).

  14. Externer Link: www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-georgia/

  15. Kakachia and Kandelaki (2023), Gunko (2023), Darchiashvili et al (2024).

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PD Dr Tsypylma Darieva is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), where she heads the research cluster ‘Migration and Diversity’. Darieva teaches at the Institute for Asian and African Studies at Humboldt University of Berlin. Her research interests include the anthropology of migration, transnational diaspora communities, and the transformation of urban cultures and religious diversity in the post-Soviet societies of Eurasia. She is a co-founder of the ZOiS Caucasus Network.