Poland is one of the main destination countries of Ukrainian refugees. But even before Russia’s full-fledged war against Ukraine, Ukrainians were by far the largest immigrant group in Poland.
Poland has rapidly become a new immigration country as a result of its own successful economic transition as well as economic and political challenges faced by its neighbours: Belarus and Ukraine. According to current estimates of Statistics Poland, more than three million foreigners live in Poland with its overall permanent population of 37,6 million. However, Poland’s immigration profile is somewhat unusual because the overwhelming majority of these foreigners come from a single country: Ukraine. The two countries are fairly interdependent and Poland’s migration situation is rather fluid, with the extraordinary recent influx of refugees from Ukraine further adding to the picture.
Poland’s transition into a new immigration country
Poland is rapidly transforming into a net immigration country. In addition to experiencing the highest global increase in the number of short-term labour migrants, it has received an extraordinary influx of war refugees from Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale aggression against that country. For many decades, Poland was a net emigration country; this trend intensified after Poland joined the EU in 2004. According to Statistics Poland, about 2.2 million Poles were living abroad at the end of 2020, the majority in European countries.
Despite its anti-immigration rhetoric, the migration policies of the Law and Justice (PiS) government, which was in power between 2015 and 2023, were fairly liberal. Under PiS rule, measures were introduced to make it easier for firms to employ foreign workers. According to available estimates, the number of foreigners in Poland rose from 100,000 in 2011 to two million in 2019. During that period, the overwhelming majority of foreigners were citizens of Ukraine living in Poland on short-term labour permits. Apart from Ukraine, the most common countries of origin for migrants were other post-Soviet countries, in particular Belarus and to a lesser extent Moldova, Georgia and Russia. In recent years a growing number of migrants from India have arrived in Poland. The transformation of Poland into a net-immigration country is a complex phenomenon that can be explained in terms of the convergence of a number of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The most crucial pull factor is undoubtedly Poland’s recent economic performance, which has been characterised by a rise in average salaries combined with growing labour shortage and rising demand for foreign workers as well as liberal labour immigration policies. A key stage in this regard was the introduction in 2006 of a simplified scheme for the employment of foreign workers; initially designed to support the country’s agricultural sector, the scheme was later expanded to other sectors of the economy. Yet it needs to be stressed that most migrants in Poland only have temporary status and Polish institutions dealing with immigration remain underdeveloped.
Migration from Ukraine between 1991 and 2022
The rapidity and nature of Poland’s transition into a net immigration country is unusual. This is the case not only because of the high proportion of Ukrainian migrants, but also because Poland emerged from the Second World War as a de facto monoethnic country as result of Nazi and Soviet occupation, ethnic cleansings, and compulsory post-war population transfers. The increase in the number of Ukrainian migrants arriving in Poland began soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union when the measures that had severely restricted their freedom of movement during the Cold War period were lifted. In this initial period, Ukrainians mainly immigrated to Poland for small-scale business as well as for family reasons as despite the war losses and post-war population transfers in Poland there was still a Ukrainian ethnic minority in the country. Over time there was an increase in seasonal circular migration for work in agriculture and services. After 2006 and the introduction of a new labour migration scheme, there was an increase in temporary migration for work which again included many Ukrainian citizens. This was facilitated by low travel costs, extensive pre-existing migration networks, the similarity of the two languages and the possibility of maintaining family ties in Ukraine. Before Russia’s 2014 military intervention in Ukraine, the number of short-term permits issued to Ukrainian citizens totaled 217,000. Among the migrants was a high share of middle-aged Ukrainian women who came to Poland to work in agriculture, in care or as domestic workers.
It was only after Russia’s aggression in the Donbas region and the illegal occupation of Crimea in 2014, both of which contributed towards economic recession in Ukraine, that large numbers of Ukrainian migrants started arriving in Poland. Among them was a significant number of Ukrainians who had previously worked in Russia and now opted for Poland as a result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Interestingly, although this migration was triggered by an armed conflict and could therefore in many individual cases be characterised as forced displacement, most of the Ukrainian citizens who arrived in Poland during that time applied for work permits. One reason for this was the much higher probability of a positive and rapid decision regarding a temporary residence permit in the framework of the labour market-related migration procedure. The socio-demographic profile of migrants also changed in this period: it became more diverse in terms of gender, age, migration experience, regions of Ukraine represented and destinations within Poland. More men, including younger men, began to arrive in Poland; these migrants quickly found jobs in sectors such as construction, manufacturing and the service industry.
In 2018, Poland became the European leader in the temporary employment of migrant workers. In 2019, as many as 972,000 Ukrainians – 89 percent of the total number of foreigners in Poland – took advantage of temporary work permits. This influx did not let up considerably even during the COVID-19 pandemic: in 2020, more than 857,000 Ukrainian citizens legalised their stay this way. When the measures to contain the pandemic were eased, the number of such migrants increased to 1,055,000 in 2021. It then decreased sharply as a result of Russia’s full-fledged war against Ukraine from 24 February 2022: Only 476,000 Ukrainians came to Poland for short-term work in 2022. It has been estimated that around 1.3-1.5 million Ukrainian citizens were living in Poland in early 2022 – that is, before the outbreak of full-scale Russian aggression. This number does not only include temporary work visas, but also other legal pathways to stay in Poland, including long-term labour permits, residence permits and student visas.
Mass forced migration in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
As a result of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Europe has experienced one of the biggest refugee movements since World War II. Within the first six weeks, the Russian invasion forced 4.2 million people to flee the country; another 6.5 million became internally displaced within Ukraine. The number of newly displaced Ukrainians decreased in the summer of 2022; many people returned to Ukraine. However, as of October 2023, a total of 6.2 million Ukrainian nationals remained displaced outside of Ukraine. The main destination countries have been Poland, Germany, Czechia and other EU states.
As of October 20th 2023, 958,935 Ukrainians with temporary-protection status were registered in Poland. This represents a much smaller number by comparison with the number of displaced people recorded during the first months of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the spring of 2022, up to four million forced migrants were registered in Poland; the populations of some cities doubled due to the influx of refugees. This created a significant challenge both for Ukrainian refugees – most of whom were women and children who had been forced to leave their homes at short notice – and for host communities which had to contend with factors including a shortage of suitable accommodation, budgetary constraints and strains on the education and healthcare systems. Yet Poland kept its borders open for Ukrainians fleeing the war, and the success of this initial response was made possible as a result of welcoming government policies, particularly at the local level, the emergence of various grassroots initiatives and mass social solidarity, through which large numbers of refugees were accommodated in private homes. The Polish government’s refugee policy was in general in line with the European Council’s directive to grant temporary protection to forced migrants from Ukraine. Poland also decided to enact its own special bill on the legal status of Ukrainians fleeing the war. This law encompasses all Ukrainian citizens and their family members arriving in Poland after 24th February 2022. It granted them permission to remain legally for up to 18 months (this period has since been extended) with a simplified registration process; they were also given access to the labour market, education (for children), healthcare and social assistance, provided they applied for a Polish National Identification Number (PESEL). Upon arrival, refugees receive a one-time allowance; they are also entitled to claim mainstream child benefits and other social assistance on the same terms as Polish citizens as well as free places in refugee hostels (though since March 2023 they have to cover half of their accommodation costs).
Easy access to the labour market, with comparatively low structural and institutional barriers, has made Poland a desirable destination country for Ukrainian refugees. Only one year after the outbreak of war nearly 900,000 Ukrainian refugees, or 70 percent, were registered as working in Poland. Ukrainian refugees were not, however, granted the same integration benefits (money allowances and support of social workers) as beneficiaries of international protection. Moreover, after an initial period of a few months during which they were often hosted by Polish families or in collective centres, Ukrainian refugees were faced with the task of sourcing independent accommodation. This proved to be a significant challenge due to a scarcity of available apartments in Poland’s biggest cities and rising rents. It can be assumed that difficulties in finding accommodation, a lack of long-term integration assistance and the improving security situation in Ukraine were key factors that prompted many refugees to leave Poland – either to undertake onward migration to other countries (mainly to Germany) or to return to Ukraine.
Table 1. Demographic profile of war refugees from Ukraine who registered to obtain the PESEL number in Poland
as of end of December 2022 and June 2023
December 2022
June 2023
Number of refugees
Percentage distribution
Number of refugees
Percentage distribution
Children 0-17 years
411,473
43,09%
396,600
40.14%
Working age (Men: 18-65 years, Women: 18-60 years)
482,490
50.53%
526,586
53.29%
Women
373,529
39.12%
388,592
39.33%
Men
108,961
11.41%
137,994
13.96%
Post-working age
60,926
6.38%
64,964
6.57%
Women
52,594
5.51%
54,910
5.56%
Men
8,987
0.94%
10,054
1.02%
Total
954,889
100%
988,150
100%
Number of those who lost their status
547,546
-
638,095
-
Ministry of Digital Affairs, https://dane.gov.pl/pl/dataset/2715 (Zarejestrowane ioski o nadanie statusu ukr)
Polish public opinion and the stance taken by political parties
The legacy of the past has shaped Polish public opinion about Ukrainians as well as Ukrainian public opinion about Poles. Both countries obtained their independence against a difficult historical backdrop (in Poland memories of massacres in western Ukraine during WWII committed against Polish civilians; in the case of Ukrainians, the policy of ethnic discrimination in the interwar period, when parts of modern western Ukraine belonged to Poland; and forced displacement after WWII). Consequently, when the first studies of public attitudes towards ethnic and religious groups were undertaken in Poland in the early 1990s, Ukrainians emerged as a group that were sooner disliked than liked. Over the years, however, and particularly in the wake of the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan / Revolution of Dignity, there has been a growth in positive feelings towards Ukrainians. In 2015, for example, 36 percent of Poles declared to have favourable feelings towards Ukrainians compared to 32 percent who declared unfavourable feelings (the remainder were either indifferent or undecided). Similar studies conducted in the following years revealed that wealthier Poles and inhabitants of bigger cities are more likely to view Ukrainians in a favourable light. In the context of increasing migration from Ukraine and the development of everyday relationships of Poles and Ukrainians, public opinion about Ukrainians further improved. In 2021, 43 percent of Poles declared a favourable view of Ukrainians, with only 25 percent declaring a negative view. Against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine the share of Poles with a positive view of Ukrainians then jumped to 51 percent in 2023, while the share of those declaring a negative view of Ukrainians declined to 17 percent.
There is also data on the willingness of the Polish population to accept Ukrainian refugees. Between 2015 and the outbreak of war in 2022, around 60 percent of Poles were in favour of admitting Ukrainian refugees, 35 percent were against. In two polls conducted in 2022 after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the percentage of those opposing the intake of Ukrainians fleeing the war dropped to almost zero, with 94 percent of Poles declaring themselves in favour of admitting Ukrainian forced migrants in March 2022. More recently, however, growing fatigue in relation to the social burden of refugee resettlement combined with rising inflation and an economic downturn has somewhat dampened the willingness to accept Ukrainian refugees. In January 2023, support for admitting Ukrainian refugees had dropped to 78 percent – a still impressive number.
The presence of large numbers of Ukrainians in Poland and the integration of refugees into the country’s welfare and public service infrastructure was not accompanied by an increase in the capacity of the system as a whole, especially when it came to kindergartens, schools and public healthcare. This has contributed to some social tensions, which were exacerbated by a diplomatic dispute between Poland and Ukraine over the export of Ukrainian grain. This tension reached a peak in mid-2023 and led to an increase of support for the far-right party Konfederacja, which openly opposes the provision of social assistance to Ukrainians. In a poll in July 2023, Konfederacja was supported by 15 percent of the population, yet it only received seven percent of the votes in the October 2023 parliamentary elections. It was the only party that sought to make political capital out of the presence of Ukrainian refugees in Poland during the October 2023 parliamentary election campaign; neither the ruling party nor the main opposition parties did so. This suggests that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has only modest potential in terms of mobilising public support. The mobilisation potential with regard to the admission of migrants from the Middle East or Africa is quite different: a majority of Poles reject the admission of non-European refugees. During the parliamentary election campaign, and particularly in connection with the debate on the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the negative rhetoric towards non-European refugees reached a peak.
Possible future prospects
Poland faces a dilemma in relation to the future presence of Ukrainian refugees. On the one hand, and taking into account Poland’s growing demand for labour giving its ageing and shrinking population, the influx of forced migrants could be considered highly beneficial. According to a 2022 report by the state-run Social Insurance Institution, Poland will need to take in over 200,000 new foreign workers a year over the next decade if the country is to counterbalance its current rate of working population decline. Business organizations have complained to the government that Poland is “losing the race for Ukrainians” – many of whom have already left for Germany – and called for a more proactive immigration and integration policy. On the other hand, Ukraine, which itself faces severe demographic challenges, has called on its own citizens to return and take part in the restoration of the country – and it is clearly in the national interests of Poland to promote a stable and prosperous Ukraine.
The main practical problem Poland needs to find an answer to is how to effectively use the human capital Ukrainian migrants bring with them in a way that avoids skills mismatch and brain waste; according to one study, in 2018, 85 percent employees from Ukraine working in Poland were performing activities below their competences. Ukrainian refugees in Poland have a very favourable educational profile. The available data reveals a very high proportion of people with tertiary education (60-70 percent). Yet, these skills often do not go hand in hand with Polish-language skills. In a survey conducted in late 2022 by the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, only five percent of respondents reported a good knowledge of Polish. Another significant challenge relates to the integration of those Ukrainian children who are not attending school in Poland. According to data from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), only around 50 percent of Ukrainian refugee children are currently enrolled in Polish schools. The remainder are either only attending online classes in Ukraine or have fallen between the cracks. When all of these factors are taken into account, it is clear that the integration of temporary-protection beneficiaries who decide to stay in Poland long-term will pose a considerable challenge for the new government elected into office in October 2023. Much more support will be needed with regard to access to affordable housing, the education of children, Polish language courses, re-training and the recognition of qualifications.
Marta Jaroszewicz, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. Her research interests include: links between migration and security, critical security studies, migration policies in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and in the Eurasian region. One of her current research projects focuses on Ukrainian migration to Poland.
Mateusz Krepa is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Social Sciences at the University of Warsaw and research assistant at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. He has a research focus on critical security studies and the history of political thought in the context of migration and security.