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Conspiracy Theories and Their Believers in Contemporary Japan | Facts and Contexts Matter | bpb.de

Conspiracy Theories and Their Believers in Contemporary Japan

John W. Cheng

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Contemporary conspiracy theories emerged in Japan in the 1980s and ’90s, advocated by revolutionary conspiracy theorists who blended Western conspiracy theories with extreme left- and right-wing ideologies in the Japanese context. This article gives a brief overview of the most widespread conspiracy narratives.

Due to its geographical location, Japan is prone to natural desasters. Illustration Yukari Mishima. (© bpb / Goethe-Institut)

In November 2020, hundreds of followers of JAnon (a self-proclaimed Japanese arm of QAnon) took to the streets of Tokyo to voice their support for Donald Trump and his “rigged election” claims (Kyodo News, 2020; Mainichi Japan, 2021). And in April 2022, five members of Yamato Q (a QAnon-inspired anti-vaccine group) were arrested for allegedly sabotaging a COVID-19 vaccination clinic in Tokyo to “protect children’s lives from vaccination” (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2022). These incidents have raised concerns among some journalists and scholars about the spread of extreme conspiracism, which has brought considerable turmoil from the West into Japan (Mainichi Japan, 2021; Zimmerman, 2020).

Japan is no stranger to conspiracy theories, which are often featured in its popular media. For example, the main plotlines of the internationally popular manga series Attack on Titan and Fullmetal Alchemist hinge on the conspiratorial manipulation of history and technology by elites (Greene, 2022). Beyond popular culture, however, the context of conspiracy theories and the characteristics of their believers in Japan remain largely unknown to the international community. This is because studies on conspiracy theories have concentrated primarily on Western countries, and many of those focusing on Japan are only accessible in Japanese. Against this backdrop, the following article aims to provide an introductory overview of conspiracy theories in contemporary Japan. To begin with, it contextualizes them by reviewing the relevant literature and then quantifies certain characteristics of their believers using survey data collected in 2023 for the author’s ongoing research project.

Conspiracy theories in contemporary Japan

Recent surveys have revealed that belief in conspiracy theories is not uncommon in Japan. A 2021 survey by Masaki Hata at Kyoto Prefecture University found that around 25% of the participants believed to a certain extent that new drugs were being tested on the public without their knowledge. Around 27% held the belief that secret elite groups were behind major global events (Hata, 2022). Similarly, a 2023 report by Shinichi Yamaguchi and Tomoaki Watanabe at the International University of Japan estimated that up to 29% of the Japanese population believed the US was run by pedophile cabals and 39% believed the 2020 US presidential election was rigged (Yamaguchi & Watanabe, 2023).

Xenophobic conspiracy theories

Modern conspiracy theories caught on in Japan in the 1980s and ’90s. Perhaps the most prominent among them stemmed from the doomsday rhetoric of Aum Shinrikyo, the religious cult that carried out the deadly Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack in 1995, claiming that malicious foreign forces were conspiring to take over Japan and enslave its people (Tsuji, 2018).

According to the Japanese religious scholars/historians Ryutaro Tsuji (2018; 2019) and Hidehiko Kurita (2019; 2021), before being adopted by the cult, this line of xenophobic conspiracy theories was first proposed by revolutionary conspiracy theorists like Ryu Ota and Masami Uno in the 1980s. They combined Western conspiracy theories with extreme left- and right-wing ideologies in Japanese society, such as anti-Americanism, ultra-nationalism, and revisionism. The core credo of their theories is that foreign forces, ranging from the US, the Jews, the Freemasons, and the Illuminati to even the Reptilians, have long been plotting to destroy theJapanese race and spirit by various means, such as forcing the country into World War II and installing a puppet government afterward to brainwash the Japanese public.

As ultra-nationalism was largely eschewed by the mainstream in post-war Japan, these conspiracy theories were chiefly disseminated via books, tabloids, and manga magazines. The notion that foreigners were pulling strings behind the scenes appealed to readers because it resonated with their anxiety at the time, given Japan’s perceived powerlessness in the US-Japan alliance and its political corruption as exemplified by the Lockheed Incident (Greene, 2022; Rosenbaum, 2020).

This line of xenophobic conspiracy theories was taken up and further popularized by other conspiracy theorists. Over time, it has evolved into an established subculture revolving around nationalism, racism, populism, and other fringe ideologies generally disregarded by the mainstream (Penney, 2009; Morris-Suzuki & Rimmer, 2007).

Artificial earthquakes

Another popular line of xenophobic conspiracy theories posits that major earthquakes – a significant natural disaster risk in Japan – that have hit the country were the work of foreign adversaries (Tsuji, 2012; ASIOS & Woolner, 2011; Sato, 2024). After nearly every major earthquake, from the Great Kantō earthquake in 1923 to the Noto Earthquake in 2024, similar conspiracy theories would resurface, alleging that they were artificial earthquakes triggered by tectonic weapons of foreign origin (Kubota, 2024). One of the most elaborate versions claims that the Great East Japan earthquake of 2011 and the subsequent Fukushima nuclear power plant accident were deliberately engineered by the US and its “deep state” to weaken and then take control over Japan (Tsuji, 2012; ASIOS & Woolner, 2011).

Conspiracy theories claiming to reveal the “hidden causes” of major events have emerged in the wake of other crises as well. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, widely circulated conspiracy theories claimed that the new coronavirus was a bioweapon from China (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2020) and the vaccines were part of a depopulation plan orchestrated by Bill Gates (Yamaguchi & Watanabe, 2023). More recently, after the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2022, conspiracy theories claimed it was an “insider job,” echoing the well-known conspiracy theories about the JFK assassination (Yamaguchi, 2022).

Racist conspiracy theories

In addition to foreigners and secret societies, racial minorities living in Japan are also a popular target for nationalist and xenophobic conspiracy theorists. In particular, Zainichi (ethnic Korean residents of Japan) are often victims of prejudice, a vestige of Japan’s imperial history (Ito, 2014). For instance, although the claim has been debunked, many right-wing activists still maintain that the Zainichi are more privileged in society because the Japanese government and mass media are controlled by Koreans behind the scenes (Hata, 2022).

Conspiracy theories in the Internet age

Given the decline of print media since the early 2000s, many conspiracy theorists in Japan have turned to the internet to promote their claims. Perhaps the most active are netto-uyoku (online right-wingers), far-right activists who openly and actively promote their nationalistic and xenophobic discourse, including several of the above-mentioned conspiracy theories, on the internet. They are also known for agitating online for such controversial proposals as the revision of Japan’s constitution and ritual offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine (Nagayoshi, 2021; Niguchi, 2019).

Although the number of netto-uyoku is estimated at under 2% of internet users in Japan, the country’s largely unrestricted internet environment [26] has allowed them to promote their ideologies openly and vocally online, in particular on forums and social media (Tsuji, 2017; Nagayoshi, 2019).

Do people believe in these conspiracy theories?

Overall, the results of this survey (Fig. A) bear out prior studies (Hata, 2022; Yamaguchi & Watanabe, 2023) indicating that the prevalence of belief in conspiracy theories is not negligible in Japan. Depending on the theory, 14.2% to 33.3% of the respondents expressed some degree of belief in a conspiracy theory. Among the ten selected theories (Table 1), the one claiming COVID-19 was a bioweapon and the one about the assassination of JFK were the most commonly believed, with roughly one-third of the respondents saying they could be true to some extent. One reason for the popularity of these theories, as Shinichi Yamagishi points out, is that believing one knows a “truth” that is concealed from the public gives people a sense of superiority (Yamaguchi, 2022).

Tab. 1: Studied conspiracy theories

No.LabelStatement
1WW2“Japan was forced into WW2 by the US and its own ‘shadow government’ in order to destroy the superior Japanese national spirit.”
2Puppet government“The Japanese government and media cannot be trusted. They are puppets of foreign powers seeking to brainwash the Japanese public.”
3Koreans“Japanese political and social systems are run by Korea and Koreans behind the scenes.”
4Artificial earthquake“The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was an artificial earthquake created by the US and deep state to cripple Japan’s economy.”
5COVID-bioweapon“The new coronavirus is a weapon created by a laboratory in China and spread deliberately.”
6COVID-depopulation“The new coronavirus and vaccines were created by Bill Gates to depopulate the planet and enslave human beings.”
7Abe-assassination“Shinzo Abe was assassinated by someone else. The government is hiding the truth.”
8JFK-assassination“The assassination of John F. Kennedy was orchestrated by the CIA and secret organizations. The government is hiding the truth. ”
9QAnon“Trump is fighting for his life against the deep state. The 2020 US election was rigged.”
10Climate change“Climate change is a hoax created by scientists bribed by green energy and nuclear power companies.”

How did the study work?

To find out whether people in Japan believe in certain conspiracy theories, the author conducted a questionnaire survey in March 2023. The pool of respondents comprised a nationally representative quota sample (in terms of age, gender, and area of residence) of 1,447 adult residents of Japan between 20 and 69 years old.

The respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disbelieve to 7 = strongly believe) how much they believe in certain conspiracy theories along with other questions about their political views and media usage. The ten conspiracy theories selected for this study ranged from xenophobic and racist claims to theories concerning COVID-19, assassinations of national leaders, Trump and climate change denial.

As for the conspiracy theories with xenophobic or racist undertones, 24.1% expressed some degree of belief that the Japanese government and media are puppets of foreign powers (“Puppet government”) and 20.4% that Japan was forced into World War II by the US and the Japanese shadow government (“WW2”). Even though the claims that the Japanese government is controlled by Koreans (“Koreans”) and that the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was the work of the US and its deep state (“Artificial earthquake”) were among the least widely believed, still 16.6% and 14.2% of the respondents, respectively, believed there might be some truth to these assertions. It is also worth noting that despite having made headlines, the QAnon-related conspiracy theories (“QAnon”) selected for the questionnaire were also among the least believed (14.4%). The overall results indicate that, as Ryutaro Tsuji (2012) has observed, contemporary conspiracy theories in Japan reflect ideologies from both the left and right extremes of the political spectrum and appeal to a sizable segment of the Japanese populace.

Who are the believers?

According to Shinichi Yamaguchi and Tomoaki Watanabe (2023), college-educated people in their 50s and 60s who strongly adhere to a political ideology – whether left- or right-wing – are more susceptible to conspiracy theories. Interestingly, the results of the survey under consideration here (Fig. B) show otherwise. On average, people in the “believers” group were significantly younger (40.9 years old) than those in the other groups (45.8), and their political ideology and education levels were actually similar to the other groups’. Nor did they tend to possess the typical characteristics of netto-uyoku (online right-wingers) (Nagayoshi, 2021). Their average degree of trust in government and their opinions on revising Japan’s constitution and bolstering its national defense did not differ significantly from the other groups either.

What set the “believers” apart from the other groups, according to the results of this study, was that they tended to hold a more negative view of foreigners (“racist attitudes”) and to be more active on social media (“social media engagement”). These characteristics fit the description of onrain haigaishugi-sha (online xenophobes) proposed by Kikuko Nagayoshi at the University of Tokyo. According to Nagayoshi, although these active internet users hold negative views of foreigners, especially Chinese and Koreans, unlike typical netto-uyoku (online right-wingers), they do not embrace ultra-nationalist ideologies (Nagayoshi, 2019). As Masaki Hata has further elaborated, these individuals tend to identify as just futsū no nihon-jin (ordinary Japanese). They hold politics in contempt, dissociate themselves from all political parties and ideologies, and avoid political discussions in their everyday lives. And yet, they are more receptive to conspiracy theories advocated by right-wing activists (Hata, 2022).

Key Findings

In sum, based on the survey results, up to an estimated 19% of the Japanese population believes to varying degrees in conspiracy theories, including those with xenophobic or racist undertones. However, they do not necessarily support these ideologies. Instead, as Kikuko Nagayoshi (2019) and Masaki Hata (2022) have explained, in Japan, a nation that values social harmony and tends to refrain from discussing political opinions in everyday life, conspiracy theories may offer a way for some to reflect or channel their personal opinions or biases. Moreover, a recent study by the author and colleagues also finds that while many people in Japan do not reject conspiracy theories, they do not think highly of them either (Cheng et al., 2024).

Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that even though the data shows correlations between conspiracy theory beliefs and racist attitudes, that does not mean that people who believe in conspiracy theories are racists or vice-versa. Rather, this finding highlights the need for further empirical studies of the causal relationships between these two traits in order to better understand the social and political implications of conspiracy theories in Japan. This is a particularly topical subject now that the country finds itself at a crossroads, opening up to immigration to mitigate the problems of an ageing population problem.

Tab. 2: Group beliefs in conspiracy theories

mean and 95% confidence interval

Source: Cheng (2024)

Methodology

To identify believers of each conspiracy theory, a two-step cluster analysis was conducted to separate the respondents into homogeneous groups based on their stated degrees of belief in the ten selected theories. The analysis yielded four distinct groups. Based on their degrees of belief in the various conspiracy theories, the groups were characterized as follows:

  1. “Non-believers” (23.7%): People in this group tended to reject all the conspiracy theories as falsehoods.

  2. “Indifferent” (32.7%): People in this group were indifferent towards the conspiracy theories; they neither strongly believed nor disbelieved them.

  3. “Curious believers” (24.7%): People in this group tended to disbelieve most of the conspiracy theories, but were more receptive to the popular ones (COVID-bioweapon and JFK-assassination).

  4. “Believers” (18.9%): People in this group were more likely to believe in all the selected conspiracy theories than those in the other groups.

To identify the characteristics of the “believers,” one-way ANOVA tests were used to compare their personal opinions and sociodemographic backgrounds with the other groups. The comparison parameters included age, education, gender, political orientation, trust in government, social media engagement, racist attitudes, and opinions on revising the constitution.

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Fussnoten

Fußnoten

  1. With the kind support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI [Grant Number 22K13552].

  2. Cluster analysis: An exploratory statistical method commonly used to reveal natural groupings within a population based on specified variables [30.]. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used in this study.

  3. One-way ANOVA (analysis of variance): A statistical method commonly used to test whether the mean averages of two or more independent groups are statistically different using pairwise comparisons [31].

  4. Measured by respondents’ self-identified political orientation (1 = conservative to 5 = progressive).

  5. Measured by respondents’ degree of trust in government (1 = strongly distrust to 4 = strongly trust).

  6. Measured by a question asking how often respondents expressed opinions on social media platforms (1 = never to 5 = almost daily).

  7. Measured on a modified Japanese version of Fraser and Murakami’s modern racism scale (1 = low to 7 = high) [32].

  8. Measured by respondents’ opinions on revising Japan’s constitution and strengthening its national defense (1 = strongly support to 5 = strongly against).

Weitere Inhalte

John W. Cheng is an associate professor of intercultural communication at the College of Liberal Arts at Tsuda University in Japan. He holds a PhD in International Studies from Waseda University. His research is on the social impact of ICT and media, and his current research project focuses on information challenges in the post-COVID world. His work has been published in various academic journals, including Health Communication, Telecommunications Policy, Telematics and Informatics, and the Asian Journal of Social Psychology. He is a member of IEEE, IET, ITS, and JSICR.