

Japan

Introduction

Only two million foreigners live in Japan.⁵ In other words, immigrants make up no more than 1.63% of the total population – a tiny percentage for an economically successful and politically stable nation and astonishing in view of its long history of international immigration and emigration. If we consider the history of Japanese migration as one of extremes, in which phases of totally unrestricted contact with the international community alternated with others of almost hermetic isolation, the present phase would have to be seen as one of half-hearted opening. This is evident both in Japan's international relations and in its immigration policy. What should be noted here is that Japan's government sees the current tentative opening up of the borders of the national labor market as covered by other areas of international policy – repatriation of ethnic Japanese, development cooperation or free trade agreements. The topic of international labor migration

Background Information¹

Capital: Tokyo

Official language: Japanese

Area: 377,955 km²

Population (2011): 127,799,000²

Population density (2011): nationwide average of 343 inhabitants per km²; in Tokyo 6,016 inhabitants per km²

Population growth (2011): -1.6% (negative growth since 2005)

Labor force (7/2012): 62,770,000 persons; participation rate: 59.2% (men: 70.8%; women: 48.3%)

Foreign-born population (2011): 2,078,480 persons (1.63%)³

Unemployment rate (7/2012): 4.3%

Religions (2007): Shinto (105 million), Buddhist (89 million), Christian (2 million), other (9 million)⁴



and its economic necessity is not, however, addressed. Hence there is in Japan's immigration policy a quite remarkable discrepancy between political aspiration and actual result.

Historical Development of Migration

Archaeological evidence exists showing that immigration to Japan from what is now Korea and China was already taking place in prehistoric and early historical times. The first⁶ wave of immigration to be documented in written form in Japanese sources can be traced back to the sixth century; subsequently, Buddhism and the Chinese era system were imported into Japan.⁷ Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, who first arrived around the middle of the sixteenth century, brought with them not only western ideas but also new kinds of weapons. After an initial period of cooperation with some of the local chieftains it was not long before the newcomers were caught up in violent civil strife and expelled from the country.⁸

Period of seclusion

Thus began, in the seventeenth century, Japan's period of seclusion,⁹ which, under the newly established military rule of the Shoguns, virtually isolated the country from foreign influence for two and a half centuries. Almost the only exception

was Dejima, an artificial island in the Bay of Nagasaki, where Dutch and British traders were permitted to land. There was also a flourishing trade with China and south-east Asia, which, operating through the narrow straits of the Ryūkyū Kingdom,¹⁰ reached as far as the most southerly of Japan's main islands, Kyūshū.¹¹ In this period immigration by non-Japanese – or even the attempt to set foot on Japanese soil – was forbidden on pain of death.

Period of opening up

The “opening up” of Japan was finally enforced by Matthew C. Perry, a Commodore in the U.S. Navy, who docked at the port of Edo, modern Tokyo.¹² With diplomacy and the threat of military force he not only succeeded in concluding a bilateral trade agreement but also provoked domestic upheavals in Japan that led to the overthrow of the Shogunate system and to the restoration of the imperial system of rule. This new system of rule, the *Meiji* state (1867–1912),¹³ aimed to achieve a large measure of economic openness, in particular towards the USA and the states of Europe. This was designed to be accompanied by technological progress and industrialization and by the modernization of numerous social spheres, including the legal system¹⁴ and the education system. The central pillar of these modernization efforts consisted of the establishment of foreign missions for a young educated elite of the country¹⁵ and the employment of foreign academics and merchants in Japan.¹⁶

'Old-comers'

As it continued to modernize, Japan became the destination of migrants from China and Korea. In 1917 the Chinese, who had hitherto been the largest minority in Japan, were overtaken by the Koreans – the result of the colonization of Korea in 1910 and the consequent relative freedom of travel between the two territories. In 1939 the Korean mobilization began and Japanese firms were given the right to engage Koreans as workers in Japan. From 1941 forced labor from the Chinese territories was recruited in a similar manner, approx-

imately 42,000 persons in total. In 1938 the proportion of Koreans on the main Japanese islands already amounted to 1% (approx. 800,000 persons) and by the end of the war it had risen to 2%. At the end of the war 31,000 Chinese forced laborers were also living in Japan as well as 28,000 immigrants from Japan's then colony of Taiwan. Today, Korean or Chinese immigrants and their descendants who have been resident in Japan since the war are referred in the literature as 'old-comers'.¹⁷


Emigration

Despite this immigration, in the first half of the twentieth century Japan was regarded as a country of emigration. Between 1885 and 1942 some 800,000 Japanese emigrated, chiefly for economic reasons. The United States and numerous countries in the Asia Pacific region were among the destination countries of this emigration. After the *Gentlemen's Agreement* of 1908, which restricted emigration to the USA from Asia, the countries of Latin America, especially Brazil and Peru, gained in popularity among Japanese emigrants. In the space of three decades some 190,000 Japanese emigrated to Brazil; by 1988, after further emigration had taken place and families had been raised, the Japanese community had grown to 1.2 million. Emigration to Manchuria and to the new colonial territories of Korea and Taiwan – at the end of the war there were about a million Japanese settlers living in the colonial territories – served political rather than economic interests, specifically the manifestation of newly created state boundaries through a policy of settlement.¹⁸

'Newcomers'

In 1955 the number of foreigners registered as resident in Japan was 641,482 (0.71% of the total population), the majority of them being Koreans who had lost their colonial Japanese citizenship after the end of the war. The 1970s finally saw the beginnings of return migration to Japan from north-east China by second or third generation Japanese, representing a delayed wave of repatriation after the end of Japanese imperialism. At the same time three further streams of emigration to Japan by 'newcomers' were getting under way. These comprised, firstly, female migration from Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines (many of these women were categorized as 'entertainers' and worked in the sex industry), secondly – reflecting the internationalization of the Japanese economy – business people from the USA and the countries of western Europe, and thirdly, refugees from Indochina.¹⁹ But the 'newcomer' migration of the 1970s brought scarcely any increase in the immigrant population. Thus in 1985 they numbered no more than 850,612 (0.7% of the total population). It was not until the following decade that a noticeable rise in Japan's immigrant population was observed; this was to continue until 2008, albeit in a weaker form.

Figure 1: Size of the immigrant population



Source: MOJ (2011b, p.19); MOJ (2012a)

Current Development of Migration

In 1990 there were 1,075,317 immigrants registered as resident in Japan (0.87%), in 1995 the figure was 1,362,371 (1.08%) and finally in the year 2000 it was 1,686,444 (1.33%). In 2008 the immigrant population reached its highest level to date with 2,217,426 persons (1.74%). In the space of 18 years the size of the immigrant population doubled. In particular, the immigrant communities from China and Brazil experienced a dramatic rise.

In Japan the impact of the world economic crisis of 2008/2009 was reflected in a decline in the economically active immigrant population. This numerical decline has continued, to a limited extent, to this day. Currently (2011) 2,078,480 immigrants are registered as resident in Japan, representing 1.63% of the total population – which since 2005 has itself been experiencing moderate negative growth.²⁰

Immigration after the revision of the Immigration Law

The revision of Japan's Immigration Law²¹ of 1990 gave rise to the numerical increase, which continued until 2008, in the resident immigration population in the country. Two aspects call for particular attention. Firstly, the revision of the law of 1990 commenced with the 'long-term residence' group,²² a new category of residence, designed especially for the needs of the substantial Japanese population in Latin America, particularly in Brazil and Peru. Descendants of former emigrants, extending as far as the third generation, could now enter Japan as 'long-term residents' and engage in economic activity without restriction.²³ Following this revision of the law the Brazilian and Peruvian immigrant population in Japan grew by more than five and a half times in each case.²⁴ Secondly, the system of "trainees", or technical internships, – now highly controversial – was expanded within the framework of the revised Immigration Law by a decree of the Ministry of Justice. Since August 1990 small businesses with fewer than 20 employees have been able to accept 'trainees' or 'technical interns' from developing or emerging countries.²⁵ The trainee program is financed by the Japanese budget for international development work and is designed to accelerate the spillover of technical knowledge in developing and emerging countries.²⁶ The vast majority – up to 80% – of the international trainees in Japan come from China.²⁷

In practice it is clear that the trainee program – like the category of 'long-term residence' for those of non-Japanese origin – meets the needs of the low wage sector, which is not catered for in Japan's official immigration policy. A similar picture is emerging for the most recent initiative in Japan's immigration policy, the recruitment from se-

lected south-east Asian countries, under bilateral agreements, of care workers for the sick and elderly.

Care migration


Since 2008 and 2009 respectively, under bilateral agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines, up to 1,000 care workers for the sick and elderly per year from each of these countries have been able to travel to Japan,²⁸ where after taking a compulsory six-month Japanese language course they are able to take employment as assistant care workers – without regard to their previous qualifications. After four years at the latest, Japan's state examination for nursing or elderly care must be passed or the work visa may be withdrawn. Success in the examination guarantees an unlimited residence and work permit.²⁹

Since the introduction of the agreement, however, no more than 17 Indonesian and two Filipino care workers have passed the examination. The biggest hurdle has proved to be the written Japanese language. Moreover, it has become clear that the system of migration to Japan for care work is not attractive to potential immigrants; in particular, criticism focuses on the refusal to recognize existing professional qualifications and on the high value placed on linguistic competence. In fact, so far only 791 Indonesian and 532 Filipino care workers have come to Japan via this channel of immigration – far below the target quota.³⁰ Initially praised as a countermeasure to meet an increasingly acute shortage of care workers for an aging population, the present system of immigration for care workers is proving impractical and ineffective.³¹

Migration Policy

The channels of labor migration to Japan outlined above – the programs for ethnic Japanese, for international trainees and for care workers – are all, without exception, state-initi-

Figure 2: Immigrant population as percentage of total population



Source: MOJ (2011b, p.19); MOJ (2012a)

ated channels, and yet they run counter to the fundamental principles of Japan's immigration policy. These principles rest on two pillars: firstly, immigration should only be available to highly skilled individuals, and secondly, immigration should always be on a purely temporary basis. None of the three cases outlined above normally involve highly skilled immigrants and in two of the three cases – the ethnic Japanese and the care workers – the option exists to acquire a long-term or permanent residence permit on the basis of blood relationships or professional qualification.³²

Other groups for whom these fundamental principles do not apply include members of families with Japanese citizenship (2010: 196,248 persons) and other immigrants with permanent residence permits (2010: 565,089 persons plus 20,251 family members) and, in particular, the descendants of Korean and Chinese migrants from the colonial period (2010: 399,106 persons).³³ These groups alone amount to more than half the immigrant population of Japan; if we include the ethnic Japanese³⁴, the trainees³⁵ and the dwindling number of care workers, then two thirds of Japan's immigrant population fail to meet the criteria of the country's immigration policy – and we should note that this failure is not only condoned by the institutions of the state but in most cases is a direct result of the political initiatives of these institutions. Japan is thus an extreme case of the divergence between *policy output* (official guidelines) and *policy outcome* (actual result) in migration policy.³⁶

Reforms not yet in sight

The Business Federation *Nippon Keidanren*, which is normally highly influential, has for the last ten years been calling for a revised immigration policy, one which targets the serious gaps in the labor market, not only in the care sector but also in shipbuilding and agriculture. In addition, business leaders are also hoping for a revitalization of the employment situation through diversification.³⁷

Neither the major political parties nor the public in general view immigration as a key concern. Only since the publication of the United Nations report on replacement migration in the industrial countries³⁸ has it been picked up as part of the debate on the aging and shrinkage of the population. In this context, however, immigration is understood as a sign of a national crisis – stagnation of population and economic growth – from which the nation seems unable to escape by its own efforts.³⁹ Consequently the discourse regarding immigration – together with the almost routine discourse on the criminality of foreigners⁴⁰ – is extremely negative in tone.

Even allowing for many minor reform initiatives in recent years,⁴¹ Japan's political leadership lacks a genuine vision of how to reshape its immigration policy.⁴²

The Immigrant Population

As an immediate consequence of the revision of the Immigration Law of 1990, the Chinese, Brazilian and Peruvian populations in Japan experienced a rapid surge in numbers. In 2007 the Chinese population (2007: 606,889 persons) overtook that of the Koreans (2007: 593,489 persons) to be-

come the numerically largest immigrant population. The third largest group is represented by the Brazilians, followed by the immigrants from the Philippines and Peru.

The Chinese community


The Chinese community in Japan expanded from 150,339 persons in 1990 to 687,156 in 2010. The expansion has continued to this day. Whereas traditionally strong residence categories such as 'exchange student' (2009: 94,355 persons) showed a consistent, if moderate, rise over previous years (2005: 89,374 persons), other categories saw a more rapid rise. This was true of highly skilled jobs in technology ('engineer' 2005: 14,786 persons, 2009: 27,166 persons) and in scientific and academic professions ('cultural exchange'/ international contacts' 2005: 20,995 persons, 2009: 34,210 persons). A very significant rise was also experienced by the category 'permanent residence' (2005: 106,269 persons, 2009: 156,295 persons).⁴³

A number of conclusions concerning the composition of the Chinese immigrant population may be drawn from these statistics: Firstly, the Chinese immigrant population in Japan now consists predominantly of 'newcomers'. The number of descendants of Chinese migrants from the colonial period ('old-comers') recently (2009) amounted to no more than 2,818 persons, and the trend is downwards (2005: 3,170 persons).⁴⁴ Secondly, the 'newcomer' population is extremely diverse. In recent years the Chinese in particular, after completing their education at Japanese universities, have switched to the Japanese labor market and thus come into one of the residence categories for the highly skilled. Despite their dominance in, for example, the trainee sector, the Chinese in Japan have long since ceased to be represented solely in the low wage sector, but are increasingly active as highly skilled workers, especially as transnational *entrepreneurs*, facilitating access to the market for large numbers of small and medium-sized Japanese businesses.⁴⁵ Thirdly, the Chinese immigrant population has proved to be relatively resistant to the economic crisis of 2008/09; it has suffered no decline in numbers. This gives rise to the inference that stable networks exist within the immigrant population and that there is increased economic activity in the highly skilled sector of the workforce.

The Korean community

The second largest immigrant population in Japan originates from Korea. In 2010, 565,989 Koreans were registered as resident in Japan. Unlike the Chinese immigrant population the Korean population has experienced a steady decline since 1990 (687,940 persons). This is due, in particular, to the decline in the 'old-comer' population. The number of Koreans who migrated during the colonial period and of their descendants is falling significantly. Whereas in 2005 447,805 persons came into this category – defined as 'special permanent residence' – in 2009 there were only 405,571.⁴⁶ The reasons for the decline are twofold: firstly, deaths among the former immigrants, now advanced in years, and secondly, naturalization among the Koreans, now of the third and fourth

Figure 3: Immigrant population by nationality



Source: MOJ (2011b, p. 20); MOJ (2012a)

generation. A moderate increase in other residence categories, such as 'exchange student' (2005: 16,309 persons, 2009: 19,807 persons) are not currently sufficient to compensate for this decline.⁴⁷

Immigrants from Brazil and Peru

Relatively well paid jobs in the Japanese automotive and electronic industries on the one hand and a difficult economic situation in Brazil and Peru on the other hand, together with the existence of close networks of recruitment agencies for Brazilians and Peruvians of Japanese descent looking for work in Japan – all these factors led to a rapid rise in Brazilian and Peruvian immigration figures in Japan.⁴⁸ Japan's Brazilian community grew from 56,429 persons in 1990 to 230,552 in 2010. It reached its greatest size to date in the year 2007 with 316,967 persons.⁴⁹ The graph for the Peruvian immigrant population runs along similar lines, although at a lower numerical level. The Peruvian community grew from 10,279 persons in 1990 to 54,636 in 2010. It reached its highest level in 2009 with 59,723 persons.⁵⁰

The current numerical decline of both of these immigrant populations can be explained by the drop in the level of production in Japan's automotive and electronic industries after 2008 and the subsequent redundancies among workers on temporary employment contracts.⁵¹ This sequence of events is very clearly exemplified by the dramatic decline in the Brazilian immigrant population in the category of 'long-term resident', which was created to function as a *de facto* work permit for ethnic Japanese immigrants from Brazil and Peru in particular.⁵² This group shrank from 153,185 persons in 2005 to 101,250 in 2009.⁵³ The Japanese government had reacted to the economic crisis and the following widespread redundancies among the immigrant populations in the automotive and electronic industries with a halfhearted program of linguistic and technical training for the ethnic Japanese population. But it was a different measure that attracted par-

ticular attention and criticism both in Japan and internationally: the Japanese government offered ethnic Japanese immigrants money (the equivalent of approx. 3,000,- Euro per worker and approx. 2,000,- Euro per family member) if they decided to return to their country of origin. The program operated between April 2009 and March 2010 and 21,675 people took advantage of it.⁵⁴

Immigrants from the Philippines

Japan's fourth largest immigrant population originates from the Philippines. Consisting of 210,181 persons (2010), it is only marginally smaller than the Brazilian immigrant population, which has shrunk so rapidly in recent years. The Filipino population, by contrast, is growing: in 1990 it amounted to 49,092 persons. Numbering 84,407 (2009), and 46,027 persons (2009) respectively, the residence categories 'permanent residence' and 'member of a family with Japanese citizenship' are currently by far the largest groups.⁵⁵ Filipino immigration to Japan is predominantly female. Feminist migration literature is fond of drawing a parallel, in the context of their "welfare-like" image, between the women who, in the category of 'entertainer', found work in Japan's sex industry in the 1970s, the women who migrated in order to participate in the 'marriage market' in the 1980s, and today's immigrants seeking work as carers for the sick and elderly;⁵⁶ in this connection attention is often drawn to the subject of the vulnerability of female immigrants.

Citizenship

Open access to citizenship is regarded as offering the best opportunity to protect the rights of immigrants.⁵⁷ This is particularly true of a country like Japan, where it is a matter of legal dispute whether the human rights named in the constitution apply to Japanese citizens only or to immigrants as well. Moreover, there is no article in the constitution that explicitly addresses the rights and duties of the immigrant population.⁵⁸

Japan's Nationality Law⁵⁹ is based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, according to which a child's citizenship is normally determined by that of the parents' (Art. 2). Articles 4 to 10 contain information on the process of naturalization. It states that any non-Japanese person may apply for Japanese citizenship; a decision on the application rests with the Minister of Justice (Art. 4). The basic requirements for successful applicants are as follows: The main focus of their lives for the previous five years must have been in Japan; the residence category 'student' is explicitly excluded here. Applicants must be at least 20 years old and must not have a criminal record;

in particular they must not have engaged in anti-constitutional activities. Furthermore they must be able to support themselves financially and must be prepared to give up their previous citizenship in favor of Japanese citizenship. Details of special cases are set out in the articles that follow.⁶⁰

In 2010 there were 13,072 applications for naturalization, of which 234 were refused. The majority of the successful applications (approx. 6,600) came from the Korean immigrant population. The second largest group was represented by the Chinese immigrant population with approx. 5,000 applications. Naturalization is by no means a mass phenomenon in Japan and nor is it a topic of public discourse. This, of course, is not true of prominent individuals like Masayoshi Son, a native Korean and CEO of the Softbank Corporation, Marutei Tsurunen, Member of the Upper House and a native of Finland⁶¹, or the television star Bobby Ologun, who was born in Nigeria. In the year 2012 the case of the Japanese television star Hiroshi Neko made headlines when he took Cambodian citizenship in order to fulfill his dream of taking part in the Olympics marathon. His times were not fast enough to qualify him for the Japanese Olympic team.⁶²

Integration

The concept of integration⁶³ was first mentioned as a political aim of migration policy in a Japanese government document in 2006. This document represented an outline plan for individual prefectures and municipalities, which were required to implement the integration of immigrants through the concept of *tabunkakyōsei*. What lies behind this term is an appeal for multiculturalism and a lively debate on whether the concept should be understood as *multi-cultural coexistence*, which is the literal translation, or as *multi-cultural community building*, which is what is called for by Keizo Yamawaki, a political scientist at Meiji University in Tokyo and one of the initiators of the program.⁶⁴ The two interpretations differ in the degree of engagement and the will to change that ought to be demanded of Japanese society.

The political scientist Takashi Kibe of the International Christian University in Tokyo, however, argues that from the immigrants' point of view neither of these two approaches goes far enough. According to Kibe, rather than this 'culture-oriented move' what is needed is a 'workforce-oriented move'. Efforts at integration should not be about simply gaining an understanding of foreign cultures but ought to shape the everyday conditions of life and work in a new way, based on equality of rights.⁶⁵ Critics of this concept – one that is understood by the Japanese government as central to the successful integration of the immigrant population – also point to the restrictions hindering its implementation at a local level. The municipalities that are supposed to implement the *tabunkakyōsei* receive neither additional funding nor administrative support. True, some active municipalities do have detailed plans of action, but the bulk of municipalities, say the critics, remain as firmly attached as ever to the three Fs – *fashion, festivals, food* – with integration nothing but window dressing.⁶⁶

Refuge and Asylum

As in the field of integration, in that of refuge and asylum too Japan is a 'belated nation'. Japan did not ratify the UN Convention on Human Rights until 1981 – thirty years after it had come into force. Since that time the number of persons recognized as refugees in Japan amounts to no more than 598; 307 of these originate from Myanmar. In 2011 the Japanese Ministry of Justice dealt with over 2,999 applications (2,119 first applications and 880 appeals). Of these, 21 were recognized: in 248 further cases a residence permit was issued on humanitarian grounds. Thus in 2011 only 0.7% of applications for refugee status were granted. The year 2011 therefore represents a steady continuation of the preceding cautious trend in Japanese refugee policy.⁶⁷

Irregular Migration

Irregular migration is attributable to one main cause: failure to leave the country after the expiry of the residence permit. In 2011 the Ministry of Justice recorded 78,488 irregular immigrants in Japan. The vast majority (54,220 persons – 69.1%) entered Japan with the status of 'short residence', which provides for a stay of a maximum of 90 days for the purpose of tourism or business. It is worth noting that with 4,322 persons the group of irregulars entering the country as 'students' makes up the second largest group, but amounts to less than a tenth of the first placed group.⁶⁸ Nevertheless this group, in particular the students from China, is the main focus of public discourse surrounding irregular migration.

In recent years, as a result of a large-scale campaign initiated in 2004 by the Ministry of Justice,⁶⁹ irregular migration has drastically declined. One of the controversial *tools* of the campaign was an internet platform on which people could enter information anonymously (address, workplace etc.) about persons they suspected of being irregular migrants. This and other dubious methods led to a marked fall in the number of irregulars in Japan: from 198,646 persons at its peak (1993) there was first a slight decline to 193,745 in 2006, then from 2006 the campaign was expanded and more widely publicized: in the following year (2007) the number of irregular migrants fell to 170,839 persons. Today the number is less than half the size it was at its peak in 1993,⁷⁰ the numerical decline being constant for all nationalities. In 2011 the largest group of irregular migrants came from Korea (19,271 persons), followed by China (10,337), the Philippines (9,329), Taiwan (4,774), Thailand (4,264) and Malaysia (2,442).⁷¹ It is noticeable that irregular migration to Japan is predominantly a phenomenon of immigrants from Asian countries who are looking for work in Japan, which remains an economic magnet for the region.

Current Developments and Future Challenges

Officially, Japan's immigration policy opens the country's borders exclusively for temporary immigration and the highly skilled group. *De facto*, however, two thirds of the immigrant population fail to meet one or both of these criteria. This dis-

crepancy between political aspiration and actual result has existed under all Japanese governments over the last two decades. It enables some labor-intensive sectors that are looking for workers – such as agriculture or the construction industry – to admit some degree of international labor migration but to do so without naming it as such and having to engage in the ensuing public discourse on the subject.

Demographic change

Currently, however, with its rapidly progressing demographic change, Japan is facing a new challenge of unprecedented proportions.⁷² Japan's population is aging and shrinking; in particular the economically active population is shrinking. Whilst 'replacement migration' alone would be insufficient to halt this trend, the damage can at least be mitigated by targeted support for individual economic sectors, for example the health sector. Furthermore, international labor migration and a stronger diversification of the business world generally – specifically regarding gender balance – offers a huge potential for innovation, which in view of increasing economic competition from China⁷³ Japan cannot afford to ignore.

Notes

- ¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the data given relates to the 2012 Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Interior Ministry (MIAC 2012).
- ² According to the last nationwide census, held on 1-10-2010, the total population amounted to 128,057,352 (MIAC 2011).
- ³ MOJ 2012a.
- ⁴ U.S. Department of State 2010. Many Japanese reject exclusive allegiance to one religion; the total number of adherents of the above religions is therefore greater than the total population of Japan.
- ⁵ This number includes all foreigners registered as resident in Japan. Registration is compulsory in the case of residence exceeding 90 days for all status groups except members of the US military and holders of diplomatic and other official or service passports (Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 116).
- ⁶ E.g. in the *Nihon Shoki*, known as the Chronicles of Japan.
- ⁷ Totman 2005: 38–59.
- ⁸ Totman 2005: 203–235.
- ⁹ Jap.: *Sakoku*, the "closed country".
- ¹⁰ In the territory of Okinawa Prefecture in modern Japan and the northern group of islands known as Amami, part of Kagoshima Prefecture. On this, see also: Kerr 2000.
- ¹¹ Totman 2005: 203–235.
- ¹² Jansen 2000: 274–279.
- ¹³ *Meiji* being the title given to the reign of Emperor Mutsuhito (1852–1912).
- ¹⁴ Baum (forthcoming)
- ¹⁵ Jansen 2000: 317–322.
- ¹⁶ Jap.: *Oyatoi Gaikokujin*, hired foreigners. This, however, did not represent migration on a large scale. Thus the number of foreigners living in Japan who had not emigrated from the colonies was about 54,000 in 1930, and was only 39,000 in 1940 (Morris-Suzuki 8-28-2008).
- ¹⁷ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 114–115; Morris-Suzuki 8-28-2008; Yamawaki 2000: 38–51.
- ¹⁸ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 114–115; Morris-Suzuki 8-28-2008; Yamawaki 2000: 38–51.
- ¹⁹ Komai (2001: 16) estimates that the flow of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to Japan amounted to no more than 10,000 persons. In Japan they were accorded the status of 'long-term residents'.
- ²⁰ MIAC 2012; MOJ 2011b: 19; MOJ 2012a.
- ²¹ Jap.: *Shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin ninteihō*, abbrev.: *Nyūkanhō* (The Immigration and Emigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act), which came into force on 1-1-1982. This replaces the Immigration Control Order (*Shutsunyūkoku kanri rei*, abbrev.: *Nyūkanrei*) of 10-4-1951 previously in force (Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 122–123).
- ²² Jap.: *Teijūsha*. Residence permit allowing repeated renewal, generally issued for three years in the first instance.
- ²³ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 129–130.
- ²⁴ MOJ 2011b: 20.
- ²⁵ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 128–129; Chiavacci 2011: 138–146.
- ²⁶ Vogt 2011b: 331.
- ²⁷ MOJ 2011b: 11.
- ²⁸ In addition, from 2014 care workers from Vietnam will be able to take employment in Japan on the basis of a similar agreement (*Japan Times* 4-20-2012).
- ²⁹ Vogt 2011b; Vogt and Holdgrün 2012.

- ³⁰ Ogawa 2012; Vogt 2011b.
- ³¹ Vogt 2011a.
- ³² Vogt 2007; Vogt (forthcoming).
- ³³ MOJ 2011b: 21.
- ³⁴ Their exact number is not known, as some ethnic Japanese have already changed their residence status. Currently (2010) 194,602 persons are listed as holding the status of 'long-term residents'. In 2006 it was 268,836 persons. The numerical decline in this residence category is paralleled by the reduction in the Brazilian and Peruvian immigrant population in Japan following the economic crisis (MOJ 2011b: 21).
- ³⁵ The total number registered on the various traineeship programmes currently (2010) amounts to 49,166 persons. In 2008 the number of trainees registered was 62,520 (MOJ 2011b: 28).
- ³⁶ Cornelius and Tsuda 2004: 14.
- ³⁷ Nippon Keidanren 2003.
- ³⁸ UNPD 2000.
- ³⁹ Iguchi 2001.
- ⁴⁰ Yamamoto 2004.
- ⁴¹ Roberts 2012.
- ⁴² Vogt 2011a; Vogt and Achenbach 2012.
- ⁴³ MOJ 2011a: 103.
- ⁴⁴ MOJ 2011a: 103.
- ⁴⁵ Achenbach 2012; Le Bail 2011; Liu-Farrer 2012.
- ⁴⁶ MOJ 2011a: 102; MOJ 2011b: 20.
- ⁴⁷ MOJ 2011a: 102.
- ⁴⁸ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 129–130; Tsuda 2003.
- ⁴⁹ MOJ 2011b: 20.
- ⁵⁰ MOJ 2011b: 20.
- ⁵¹ Rau and Vogt 2009.
- ⁵² Kōno 20.2.2006.
- ⁵³ MOJ 2011a: 105.
- ⁵⁴ Roberts 2012: 52–53; Vogt (forthcoming).
- ⁵⁵ MOJ 2011a: 104; MOJ 2011b: 20.
- ⁵⁶ Ballescas 2009: 135.
- ⁵⁷ Piper 2002: 195.
- ⁵⁸ Behaghel and Vogt 2006: 121–122.
- ⁵⁹ Jap.: *Kokusekihō*. Law of 4.5.1950 (147/1950); final revision with Law 88/2008.
- ⁶⁰ MOJ 2008.
- ⁶¹ Tsurunen 2011.
- ⁶² *Japan Times* (12-27-2011).
- ⁶³ Jap.: *tōgō*
- ⁶⁴ Kashiwazaki 2011; Keizo Yamawaki (4-12-2007).
- ⁶⁵ Kibe 2011.
- ⁶⁶ Roberts 2012: 56–57.
- ⁶⁷ MOJ 2012b. On the refugees from Indochina in the 1970s see also Note 19.
- ⁶⁸ MOJ 2011b: 35.
- ⁶⁹ Jap.: *Fūhō shūrō gaikokujin taisaku kyanpēn*; Campaign against illegal employment of foreigners.
- ⁷⁰ MOJ 2011b: 35; Vogt (forthcoming).
- ⁷¹ MOJ 2011b: 34.
- ⁷² *Economist* 11-18-2010.
- ⁷³ In 2010 Japan was replaced as the world's second-biggest economy by China.

About the author:

Prof. Dr. Gabriele Vogt is professor for Japanese Studies at the Asia-Africa-Institute of the University of Hamburg. Her research focuses on socio-scientific research on Japan and covers not only international migration to Japan but also Japan's demographic change and topics of political participation.

Email: gabriele.vogt@uni-hamburg.de

References and Further Reading

- Achenbach, Ruth (2012), 'Networks in Transition: Migration Decisions in the Life Course of Highly Skilled Chinese in Japan', in *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 137–158.
- Ballescas, Maria Rosario Piquero (2009), 'Filipino Caregivers in Japan: The State, Agents, and Emerging Issues', in *Kyūshū Daigaku Ajia Sōgō Seisaku Sentā Kiyō* 3 (March), pp. 127–138.
- Baum, Harald (forthcoming), 'Das moderne japanische Recht. Entwicklung und Charakteristika', in Vogt, Gabriele and Phoebe S. Holdgrün (eds.), *Modernisierungsprozesse in Japan*, Munich: iudicium.
- Behaghel, Jeannette and Gabriele Vogt (2006), 'Arbeitsmigration nach Japan. Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen und politischer Diskurs', in Haak, René and Ulrike Haak (eds.), *Arbeitswelten in Japan*. Japanstudien 18, Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien, München: iudicium, pp. 111–148.
- Chiavacci, David (2011), *Japans neue Immigrationspolitik. Ostasiatisches Umfeld, ideelle Diversität und institutionelle Fragmentierung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. and Takeyuki Tsuda (2004), 'Controlling Immigration. The Limits of Government Intervention', in Cornelius, Wayne A., Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield (eds.), *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 3–48.
- Economist (11-18-2010), *Into the Unknown*, <http://www.economist.com/node/17492860> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- Iguchi, Yasushi (2001), *Gaikokujin rōdōsha shinjidai* (A new Era of foreign labor), Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho.
- Jansen, Marius B. (2000), *The Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- *Japan Times* (4-20-2012), 'Japan to Accept Nurse Candidates from Vietnam', <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120420a7.html> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- *Japan Times* (12-27-2011), 'Many angles to acquiring Japanese citizenship', <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111227i1.html> (accessed 9-18-2012).

- Kashiwazaki, Chikako (2011), 'Internationalism and Transnationalism: Responses to Immigration in Japan', in Vogt, Gabriele and Glenda S. Roberts (ed.), *Migration and Integration – Japan in Comparative Perspective*, Munich: iudicium, pp. 41–57.
- Kerr, George H. (2000), *Okinawa. The History of an Island People*, Boston, MA et al.: Tuttle.
- Kibe, Takashi (2011), 'Immigration and Integration Policies in Japan: At the Crossroads of the Welfare State and the Labour Market', in Vogt, Gabriele and Glenda S. Roberts (eds.), *Migration and Integration – Japan in Comparative Perspective*, Munich: iudicium, pp. 58–71.
- Komai, Hiroshi (2001), *Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan*, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Kōno, Tarō (2-20-2006), Vize-Justizminister im Interview mit der Autorin in Tokio. (Vice Minister of Justice in an interview with the author [Gabriele Vogt])
- Le Bail, Hélène (2011), 'Integration of Chinese Students into Japan's Society and Labour Market', in Vogt, Gabriele and Glenda S. Roberts (ed.), *Migration and Integration – Japan in Comparative Perspective*, Munich: iudicium, pp. 72–88.
- Liu-Farrer, Gracia (2012), 'Ambiguous Concepts and Unintended Consequences: Rethinking Skilled Migration in View of Chinese Migrants' Economic Outcomes in Japan', in *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 159–179.
- MIAC, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau (2012), *Japan Statistical Yearbook 2012*, <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/index.htm> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- MIAC, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau (2011), *2010 Japan Census*, <http://www-stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htm> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- MIAC, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006), *“Tabunka kyōsei suishin puroguramu” no teigen. Chiki ni okeru gaikokujin jūmin no shien chisaku nit suite* (Suggestion for a “Program to foster a multicultural coexistence”. On the measures of the districts to support foreign citizens.) http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/2006/060307_2.html (accessed 9-24-2009).
- MOJ, Ministry of Justice (2012a), *Heisei 23nen ni okeru gaikokujin tōrokushasū ni tsuite* (Registered foreign population 2011), http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00021.html (accessed: 9-18-2012).
- MOJ, Ministry of Justice (2012b), *Heisei 23nen ni okeru nanmin ninteishasūtō ni tsuite* (Refugee applications 2011), http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00021.html (Zugriff am 18.9.2012).
- MOJ, Ministry of Justice (2011a), *Heisei 22nen hatsu “Shutsunyūkoku kanri” Nihongo hatsu. Shiryō* (2010 edition “Checks of entry and departure”, Japanese version, data), <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000058060.pdf> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- MOJ, Ministry of Justice (2011b), *Heisei 22nen hatsu “Shutsunyūkoku kanri” Nihongo hatsu. Shutsunyūkoku kanri wo meguru kinnen no jōkyō* (2010 edition “Checks on entry and departure”, Japanese version, situation of the previous years), <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000081958.pdf> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- MOJ, Ministry of Justice (2008), *The Nationality Law*, <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (8-28-2008), 'Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Pre-war Japanese Empire', in *The Asia-Pacific-Journal: Japan Focus*, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2862# (accessed 9-18-2012).
- Nippon Keidanren (2003), *Japan 2025. Envisioning a Vibrant, Attractive Nation in the Twenty-First Century*, www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/vision2025.pdf (accessed 9-18-2012).
- Ogawa, Reiko (2012), 'Conceptualizing Transnational Migration of Care Workers: Between “Skilled” and “Unskilled”', in *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 95–114.
- Piper, Nicola (2002), 'Global Labour Markets and National Responses. Legal Regimes Governing Female Migrant Workers in Japan', in Gills, Doong-Sook S. and Nicola Piper (eds.), *Women and Work in Globalising Asia*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 188–208.
- Rau, Florence and Gabriele Vogt (2009), 'Below the Surface: Japan's Hidden Workforce', in *JapanInc.* (spring 2009), pp. 20–21.
- Roberts, Glenda (2012), 'Vocalizing the “I” Word: Proposals and Initiatives on Immigration to Japan from the LDP and Beyond', in *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 48–68.
- Totman, Conrad (2005), *A History of Japan*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki (2003), *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland. Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Tsurunen, Marutei (2011), 'Politics was my fated path in life', in Vogt, Gabriele and Glenda S. Roberts (eds.), *Migration and Integration – Japan in Comparative Perspective*, Munich: iudicium, p. 199.
- UNPD, United Nations Population Division (2000), *Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?* <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- U.S. Department of State (2010), *International Religious Freedom Report 2010*, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148871.htm> (accessed 9-18-2012).
- Vogt, Gabriele (forthcoming), 'Foreign Workers', in Babb, James (eds.), *Handbook of Japanese Studies*, London: Sage.
- Vogt, Gabriele (2011a), 'The Culture of Migration Politics in Japan', in Jain, Purnendra and Brad Williams (eds.), *Japan in Decline. Fact or Fiction?*, Leiden: Global Oriental, pp. 205–223.
- Vogt, Gabriele (2011b), 'The Political Economy of Health-Care Migration: A Japanese Perspective', in Coulmas, Florian and Ralph Lützel (eds.), *Imploding Populations in*

Japan and Germany. A Comparison, Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, pp. 323–346.

- Vogt, Gabriele (2007), 'Closed Doors, Open Doors, Doors Wide Shut? Migration Politics in Japan', in *Japan Aktuell. Journal of Current Japanese Affairs*, 5/2007, pp. 3–30.
- Vogt, Gabriele and Ruth Achenbach (2012), 'International Labor Migration to Japan: Current Models and Future Outlook', in: *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 8–26.
- Vogt, Gabriele and Phoebe Holdgrün (2012), 'Gender and Ethnicity in Japan's Health-Care Labor Market', in *ASIEN, The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, No. 124 (July 2012), pp. 69–94.
- Yamamoto, Ryoko (2004), 'Alien Attack? Construction of Foreign Criminality in Contemporary Japan', in Germer, Andrea and Andreas Moerke (eds.), *Grenzgänge – (De-)Konstruktion kollektiver Identitäten in Japan* (Japanstudien, issue 18), Munich: iudicium, pp. 27–57.
- Yamawaki, Keizo (4-12-2007), *The Challenges of the Japanese Integration Policy*. Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien (DIJ), Tokyo: unpublished lecture manuscript).
- Yamawaki, Keizo (2000), 'Foreign Workers in Japan. A Historical Perspective', in Roberts, Glenda S. and Mike Douglass (eds.), *Japan and Global Migration. Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*, London and New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 38–51.

Internet sources

Japan – Statistical Yearbook 2012

<http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/index.htm>

Ministry of Justice

<http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/index.html>

Ministry of Justice/Bureau of Immigration

<http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html>

Further Information

The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

<http://www.japanfocus.org/>

ABOUT FOCUS MIGRATION

Publishers: Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück, Neuer Graben 19/21, 49069 Osnabrück, Germany
Tel.: +49 (0)541 969 4384, Fax: +49 (0)541 969 4380, E-Mail: imis@uni-osnabrueck.de

German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb), 53113 Bonn; office in Berlin, Friedrichstraße 50, 10117 Berlin, Germany; with the collaboration of Network Migration in Europe e.V.

Editorial staff: Vera Hanewinkel, Apl. Prof. Dr. Jochen Oltmer (head)

Focus Migration country profiles (ISSN 1864-6220) and policy briefs (ISSN 1864-5704) are produced by the above-named cooperation partners.

The information contained in these publications does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the publishers. Partial reproduction and citation are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged.

Further online resources: www.bpb.de, www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de, www.migration-info.de, www.network-migration.org

Our country profiles and policy briefs are available online at: www.focus-migration.de

Map of Japan: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Japan.svg